Introduction and Motivation
While Donald Trump is a controversial and divisive figure within America, he is even more so outside. Part of this comes from his ideological and political incoherence; perhaps the only belief Trump has held consistently is that exports are good while imports are bad. But part of it stems from his volatile and poisonous style of leadership. In this paper, I try to link the two; I ask whether Trump's unpopularity outside the United States dampens the demands for American exports. I find that it does; countries whose leadership is approved abroad tend to sell more exports, holding all else equal. More generally, 'soft power' -the ability of one country to attract or persuade citizens in another -seems to be a significant determinant of export demand.
Methodology and Gravity Data
I am interested in whether countries are affected in any tangible way by fluctuations in soft power. In particular, I test whether changes in foreign perceptions of soft power affect actual export sales, all else equal.
I use a standard gravity model of international trade to account for other influences on bilateral exports besides soft power. In particular, I pursue "theory-consistent estimation" of the gravity equation, closely following the suggestions in the authoritative survey by Head and Mayer (2014) . I focus on their "LSDV" (Least Squares with time-varying country Dummy
Variables) technique which they show works well in many situations. I estimate: ln(X ijt ) = SOFTPOWER ijt +  1 ln(D ij ) +  2 Lang ij +  3 Cont ij +  4 RTA ijt +  5 Colony ij + {λ it } + {ψ jt } +  ijt (1) where:
 ln(X ijt ) denotes the natural logarithm of the nominal value of bilateral exports from country i to country j at time t, measured as the average of FOB exports from i to j and CIF imports into j from i,  SOFTPOWER ijt denotes a measure of the soft power that i has over country j at time t,  D is the great-circle distance between i and j,  Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language and zero otherwise,  Cont is unity if i and j share a land border and zero otherwise,  RTA is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement and zero otherwise,  Colony is unity if i colonized j or vice versa and zero otherwise,   is a vector of nuisance coefficients,  {λ it } is a complete set of time-varying exporter binary variable fixed effects,  {ψ jt } is a complete set of time-varying importer binary variable fixed effects,   ij represents the myriad other influences on exports, assumed to be well behaved.
The coefficient of interest is , the effect (on bilateral exports) of the exporter's soft power over the importer, ceteris paribus.
I estimate this equation with least squares, using standard errors robust to clustering by dyadic (ij) pair. In practice, most of the variation in exports is explained by the country-year fixed effects (one set each for the exporter and importer), which control a host of other influences on bilateral exports. For instance, any general short-term effect on American sales arising from the 2017 inauguration of Donald Trump is taken out by the 2017 American exporter fixed effect; similarly, any effect on Egyptian imports arising from the 2011 Arab Spring is taken out by the 2011 Egyptian importer fixed effect. Anything that is specific and common to a country and a year -such as the size of its economy, population, culture, policy uncertainty, leadership, or military spending, for either the exporter or the importer -is accounted for by the fixed effects. CARICOM; PATCRA; ANZCERTA; CACM, Mercosur, COMESA, and more.
Soft Power Data: the Gallup Leadership Approval Poll
The innovation in equation (1) Table A1 provides a brief summary of the range of the Gallup data,
Appendix Table A2 provides some examples of recent American data, and Appendix Table A3 provides lists of the countries included in the Gallup surveys. There are a total of 6,411 Gallup observations available for the percentages of participants approving and disapproving of the leadership of each foreign county, and I usually transform these percentages by natural logarithms. I create net fractional approval by subtracting disapproval from approval, measured as a fraction (not a percentage, so that 100% approval/disapproval corresponds to 1./-1.).
Gallup's question concerns whether survey respondents in one country approve (or not)
of the leadership in another. As such, I consider it to be a manifestation of "soft power", although the interpretation is not strictly necessary for this study. Soft power is a term first used by Joseph Nye (1990) The measure is available for a number of years, allowing panel data analysis which uses variation across countries and time. Finally, the very wording of the Gallup survey is appealing during an era of demagoguery, precisely because it focuses on foreign approval of a country's leadership.
Other Measures of Soft Power
The Gallup survey is by no means a perfect indicator of soft power. For one thing, it does not distinguish explicitly between hard (military or economic) and soft power. 5 The data coverage is limited in span, especially in the fact that respondents are only asked about a handful of foreign (exporter) countries. Finally, Gallup asks about whether participants in country j approve of the job performance of the leadership of country i, which is different from the soft power ability of i to persuade, coerce, or co-opt citizens in country j to cooperate. Table   A1 . Scatterplots of all three measures across a variety of dimensions are provided in Appendix Figure A1 ; it is clear that the different measures are highly correlated.
An Informal Look at the Gallup Data job performance disapproval across other countries was 42% in 2017, a quarter of countries put it at less than 25% while a quarter had at least 60% disapproval. This dispersion across countries might, of course, be noise. But it also opens up the possibility that this variation might be systematically linked to exports, the focus of this paper. 
A More Rigorous Approach
I now estimate equation (1), using the data and techniques set out above. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the regressand (log exports), the gravity regressors (log distance and dummies for common language/border/colonial relationship/regional trade agreement), and the Gallup approval polls. At the right-hand side of the table, I also provide simple bivariate correlations with two key variables: a) the regressand, log exports; and b) the key regressor, the net fractional approval of leadership job performance (Gallup approval minus disapproval). It is interesting to note that exports are only modestly correlated in the sample with Gallup approval, and in any case this correlation is negative (so that higher Gallup approval corresponds weakly with lower exports). While the Gallup approval, disapproval and net approval ratings are (reassuringly) strongly correlated with each other, approval is only modestly correlated with the gravity regressors, allaying fears of multicollinearity.
Baseline Results
Benchmark estimates of equation (1) The columns in the remainder of Table 2 add the three Gallup measures of leadership job performance -approval, disapproval, and net approval -one by one to equation (1) . The effect of log approval is substantial; a one percent increase in Gallup approval is associated with almost two-thirds of a percent increase in exports, holding other things constant. This is not only economically large but statistically significant; the robust t-statistic of 5.5 rejects the null hypothesis of no effect at any reasonable confidence level. Since both the regressor and regressand are in logs, the coefficient of .66 can be interpreted as the estimated elasticity of exports with respect to soft power; a one percent increase in bilateral approval delivers around two-thirds of a percent increase in bilateral exports, ceteris paribus.
Correspondingly, a one percent increase in leadership disapproval is associated with a .35 percent decrease in exports, a result which is again both economically and statistically large (the robust t-statistic is -3.5). Unsurprisingly the column at the extreme right shows that an increase in net Gallup approval has a strong positive effect; the coefficient is .9 with a robust tstatistic of 4.5. Table A2 ).
To summarize: the evidence points to a moderately powerful role of soft power in export determination, even after holding other effects constant through the gravity model.
Exporters sell more exports to countries which approve more of the job performance of their leadership.
Different Measures of Soft Power
The results in Table 2 indicate that soft power plays a strong role in export determination, even after accounting for other factors through the gravity model. However, many assumptions are built into equation (1), and it is important to know whether the apparently strong effect of soft power depends sensitively on unimportant or questionable assumptions. Since the gravity model has been widely and successfully used for decades, the most obvious thing to examine is the key soft power regressor. Accordingly, Table 3 uses a variety of alternative measures of soft power to see if the message from Table 2 is fragile. I use two different approaches: a) altering the way I use the Gallup measure; and b) using alternatives to the Gallup measure.
The top rows of Table 3 change the precise way that the Gallup measure enters equation (1) . 10 First, I use the level of the Gallup measures rather than its logarithm. 11 Next I engage in a quick check for dynamic effects: a) I substitute the lag of the Gallup measures for the contemporaneous value; and b) I include, the contemporary, first, and second lags of the Gallup measures. Neither of these substitutions changes the message of Table 2 substantively.
Using the level rather than the log of approval leaves the signs of the coefficients unchanged but eliminates the statistical significance of the disapproval effect; adding lagged effects increases the effect of soft power somewhat.
12
In the bottom part of Table 3 of the data set; and c) using different estimation strategies. I tabulate the resulting empirical estimates of  in Table 4 . As usual, there are three estimates of , for a) log approval, b) log disapproval, and c) net fractional approval. To make the robustness checks straightforward, the benchmark estimates from Table 2 are presented in the top row.
I begin by dropping the gravity model regressors (i.e., setting {β}=0). The gravity model is known to be a successful empirical model of bilateral trade flows, so it is unsurprising that dropping those variables results in a worse-fitting equation and thus a corresponding boost to the soft power coefficients. 14 data for industrial exporters (Germany, UK, and US) or industrial importers. 15 The sign and statistical significance of the  coefficients persist through these tests, and their size is often higher than in my benchmark results. Perhaps more importantly, the soft power effect does not depend on outlier observations, as shown by the perturbation that drops observations where the residual lies at least 2.5 standard errors from the mean.
16
The final set of checks provided in Table 4 variables for the Gallup measure of job performance approval. 18 The resulting IV estimates retain the signs and indeed magnitudes of the default LS estimates; five of the six coefficients remain significantly different from zero at conventional levels, despite the fact that the sample size falls by >80%. Secondly, I average the views of a particular exporter's approval in a given year across all other importing countries, excluding both the importer and all other countries that import a significant fraction (I use both 10% and 20% of total imports as thresholds) from the exporter. 19 Using either the 10% or 20% threshold, the IV estimates for the approval coefficient remain positive, large and statistically significant. However, the net approval coefficient is only significant using the 20% threshold, while both disapproval coefficients are positive and both economically and statistically insignificant. More robust IV results await better instrumental variables. Still, two-thirds of the IV estimates are similar in size and significance to the LS estimates; none delivers a message inconsistent with the LS estimates.
I conclude that the soft power effect on exports is relatively robust. The results do not vanish with different functional forms, lags, measures of soft power, country-or time-samples, or estimation techniques. It is not completely insensitive; adding dyadic fixed effects reduces the LS result to insignificance, and not all the instrumental variable results are significant. The fact that the results are resilient to most perturbations lends some confidence to the exercise.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that soft power -the ability of one country to attract Nominal bilateral American exports in $millions; Gallup approval/disapproval/net approval of the job performance of American leadership, in percentage points (net approval in fractions). 
